ByAndrew Korybko โ SURVIVE the NEWS
State Minister Misganu Arga told theย Ethiopian News Agencyย that โWe have the right to be included in the Red Sea Council as most of our trade transactions are made and our ships pass through the Red Sea corridor. Any activities that are underway across this area might affect our interest. While other nations from far away are claiming interest in the area, a country (Ethiopia) that is located only 60 to 100 kilometers from the seacoast should not be denied interest. This is not right.โ
His has a valid point too, and itโs more relevant than ever as Ethiopia steps up its quest to regain direct and full access to a Red Sea port through peaceful means. Prime Minister (PM) Abiy Ahmed explained the reasons why to parliament last month in a nearly hour-long speech that can be watchedย hereย with English subtitles. Those who havenโt followed this issue can review the following analyses to bring themselves up to speed since the rest of the present piece assumes familiarity with this subject:
The Red Sea Council that Minister Misganu referred to in his latest interview was created in January 2020 and isย officially knownย as the โCouncil of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Adenโ. It comprises all the littoral states and is supposed to function as a comprehensive regional integration platform. Accordingly, its members cooperate on issues of relevance to their collective interests, particularly economic and security ones.
For however well-intentioned its goals may be, some of its membersโ motives will always be viewed with suspicion so long as this group continues to exclude Ethiopia, which is the worldโs most populous landlocked state whose stability is directly dependent on the Red Sea. The Council could easily put these concerns to rest by at least offering that country observer status, which would dispel speculation that some of its members have an ulterior zero-sum agenda that they want to advance at Ethiopiaโs expense.
To be clear, all groups have the right to include or exclude whoever they want for whatever their reasons may be, but continuing to keep Ethiopia out of the Council perpetuates concerns about its true intentions. Instead of conforming with the multipolar trend of the times by functioning as an inclusive organization thatโs open to all those who share whatโs presented to be its membersโ purely peaceful interests, itโs remained exclusive and closed, which lends credence to speculation about its real agenda.
This state of affairs doesnโt improve the Hornโs regional security dilemma between its coastal and hinterland states, but kindles suspicions by making it seem like some of the first group are colluding to contain Ethiopia through these means. Thatโs why itโs imperative for Ethiopia to at least be offered observer status in the Council so that it can finally participate in some of the groupโs activities which involve the region upon which its security is directly dependent.
The precedent set by the Arctic Council proves that Ethiopiaโs observer status or even full membership in the Red Sea Council is reasonable even though itโs a non-littoral state. Finland and Sweden areย full membersย in the Arctic Council despite lacking direct access to its namesake ocean, while China and India areย observersย even though theyโre located very far away from that body of water. Those four and the others that participate in this group all have legitimate (mostly economic) interests in the Arctic Ocean.
With this example in mind, thereโs no reason why the Red Sea Council canโt at least offer Ethiopia observer status, not to mention full membership. Continuing to exclude it in spite of the precedent set by the Arctic Council, which counts far-away China as an observer despite itsย New Cold Warย rivalry with that bodyโs founding American member, arguably perpetuates concerns about the Red Sea Councilโs true intentions. This state of affairs only worsens the Hornโs security dilemma to everyoneโs detriment.
If the political will is present to dispel related speculation about some of its membersโ motives, which of course canโt be taken for granted but could be encouraged by the groupโs de facto Saudi leader exerting positive influence over intransigent members, then a three-step policy could easily resolve this problem. The first thing that would have to be done is to invite Ethiopia and theย UAEย to join the Red Sea Council, the latter of which also has stakes in that body of water due to its investments in Yemen and Somaliland.
This informal expansion of that group would confirm its inclusivity and pay respect to those closest non-littoral states with legitimate interests in the Red Sea. Sometime afterwards, or perhaps in coordination with this first step, the second one would then broaden the number of observers to include those countries with military bases in the region. That would bring the EU (via France and Italy), China, Japan, and the US into its ranks. India should also be invited as an observer too due to its growing importance.
Once this is achieved, the final step would be for the Red Sea Councilโs full and observer members to mediate a pragmatic agreement whereby Ethiopia could finally regain direct and full access to this body of water, which could be facilitated by some of them extending security guarantees to Djibouti. This supplementary proposal aligns with theย latestย suggestionsย for resolving theย NATO-Russianย proxy warย in Ukraine and theย latest Israeli-Hamas war, and in this case, it could preemptively avert a war in the Horn.
Speculative fears about Ethiopiaโs supposedly secret plans to invade and then annex parts of a coastal country in pursuit of its recently stepped-up plans to obtain a Red Sea port would be dispelled if a collection of responsible regional stakeholders guaranteed Djiboutiโs or whoever elseโs security. To be clear, such concerns have no basis in reality, but theyโre still sincerely believed by some while also being dishonestly exploited by others for divide-and-rule purposes as well as to discredit Ethiopia and PM Abiy.
This same collection of stakeholders could also extend equivalent security guarantees to Ethiopia in order to assuage possible concerns that whatever coastal country/countries receive such promises wonโt take advantage of them to provoke a conflict in order to compel those states to intervene in its support. Those stakeholders that already have military bases in the region (i.e. the diverse group in Djibouti and the UAE in Yemen) are the most natural guarantors for this proposed deal.
Without including Ethiopia in the Red Sea Council, whether as an observer or better yet a full member per the respective precedents set by the Arctic Council vis-ร -vis China/India and Finland/Sweden despite none of them being littoral states, suspicions about that groupโs motives will persist. The Hornโs security dilemma might then worsen and lead to a conflict by miscalculation, which all responsible stakeholders should seek to preemptively avert, ergo why Ethiopia should be invited to join the group.
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