It was striking that, at the height of Israeli diplomacyโs preoccupation with tracking the repercussions of the aggression on Gaza, developments in Syria, and the ongoing tensions with Iran, its Foreign Minister Gideon Saโar found more time to visit Ethiopia.
This visit underscores the importance of what the Israeli occupation minister discussed, and opens the door to speculation about what he discussed with his counterparts, particularly regarding the future of Houthi attacks on Israel, given Ethiopiaโs Red Sea border, and the extent of Israeli involvement in the escalating tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Periodic mutual visits and political alliances
From the Israeli perspective, Ethiopia is considered an important pivotal state, given its location in the Horn of Africa region and its proximity to Arab and Islamic countries. Therefore, it occupies a prominent position in Israelโs strategic planning, reinforced by periodic visits, both overt and covert.
Saโarโs recent visit was not his first, as he met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali and his counterpart, Gideon Timothy, who visited Israel in March. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Israel in 2012, the first prime minister to do so in thirty years.
In 2017, Abiy Ahmed reciprocated with a visit to Israel. In 2018, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin visited Addis Ababa. In 2019, Abiy Ahmed returned to Israel. Prior to these visits, former Foreign Ministers Avigdor Lieberman and Silvan Shalom visited. During all these visits, the two sides discussed strengthening comprehensive and strategic relations and signing numerous agreements in all areas.
The historical relations between Israel and Ethiopia date back to the pre-state era, specifically in 1921, when an Ethiopian delegation visited occupied Palestine and met with Jewish rabbis and leaders of the Zionist movement. In later years, especially David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Golda Meir, they established close relations with their counterparts in Ethiopia, considered Israelโs โbackyard.โ After its establishment, they established the โPeriphery Alliance,โ with Ethiopia, Turkey, and Iran, to confront the Arab nationalist tide during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
Some Israeli literature considers Ethiopia part of the โMiddle East peripheryโ and a potential pro-Israel base on the Red Sea coast. This makes it, in their view, the most important African country. Consequently, they have invested more in Ethiopia than in any other country, and have sought to facilitate the migration of Ethiopian Jews to Israel through covert operations overseen by the Mossad in the mid-1980s, despite the racist practices they face.
Saโarโs visit and meetings with Ethiopian officials are part of his 2025 strategic goals, claiming that Ethiopia plays a pivotal role in achieving this strategy. Ethiopia, meanwhile, did not hesitate to announce that it and East African countries support Israelโs return as an observer state to the African Union, from which it was expelled in 2002 under Palestinian pressure. It even admitted that Ethiopia has played a pivotal role in Netanyahuโs policy of returning to Africa in recent years.
Israel previously supported the election of former Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus to head the World Health Organization, in exchange for its support within UN institutions amid mounting diplomatic setbacks, the issuance of further international resolutions against it, and the unprecedented international isolation caused by the ongoing bloody war in Gaza.
Network of vital and strategic interests
From Israelโs perspective, strengthening relations with Ethiopia serves a number of its vital strategic interests:
Economically, by increasing general exports and securing shipping lanes through the Red Sea.
Militarily, by increasing arms sales, training its armed forces, and providing them with combat expertise.
Security-wise, it aims to gain an additional foothold around the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and to limit Iranโs growing influence in Africa. Iran has aided Ethiopia in its war against the Tigray region, significantly improving its military capabilities.
Politically, by gaining voting support in UN institutions, withdrawing it and its neighbors from the circle of support for the Palestinian cause, and siding with Israel, and undermining the efforts of the Palestinians in international forums.
Strategically: By identifying and harmonizing its friends and enemies, and focusing attention on Islamic groups as a common enemy, Israel has even attempted to unite Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Tanzania as an alliance against these groups, claiming that they directly threaten it.
Economic deals and commercial gains
On his recent visit, Saโar was accompanied by a high-level trade delegation, including dozens of representatives from Israeli companies across various sectors. The delegation met with their Ethiopian counterparts to enhance cooperation and mutual trade. The visit also included the first joint economic forum, attended by dozens of businessmen from both sides.
Hundreds of Israeli businessmen have already established a foothold in Ethiopia, amid what they describe as an โeconomic boom.โ They have invested in energy infrastructure and healthcare projects. The Israel Export Institute has even described Ethiopia as โAfricaโs hidden secretโ due to the business opportunities it offers, while Shraga Brosh, head of the Israeli Manufacturers Association, has described it as โa new economic gateway to Africa.โ
Israel is counting heavily on leveraging investment in the Ethiopian economy, in the areas of agriculture, health, education, science, technology, and innovation. This represents a promising investment opportunity, given the countryโs large size, both in area and population, as well as its central location on the continent. Ethiopia has become one of the worldโs fastest-growing economies, with a market population of 120 million. It is also a member of the Common Market of Southern Africa, allowing Israel access to markets with a population of 350 million.
Israel is monitoring the influx of more competing countries into Ethiopia, particularly Turkey and Iran, along with China, India, the United States, and Germany. Because 80% of Ethiopians earn their living from agriculture, Israeli technology could improve the productivity of their agricultural lands.
Energy Minister Eli Cohen signed an agreement to enhance cooperation with Ethiopia in the fields of energy, water, and innovation. Ethiopia is rich in water resources, but only a small percentage of them are exploited. Israel is one of the countries with the lowest water loss rates in the world, and will therefore be able to assist Ethiopia through innovation and technology in developing its water infrastructure.
But Cohen did not hesitate to reveal that โin addition to the economic gains the agreement will bring, the most important thing is that it will deepen Israelโs relations in Africa,โ following their deterioration in recent months due to the genocide in Gaza.
Israel is an ideal partner for Ethiopia for trade cooperation, due to cultural proximity and historical ties. For Israeli companies, this presents an opportune time to operate in a market experiencing sharp consumer growth, openness to foreign technology, and government support for investment. Israel believes that expanding bilateral cooperation will include key areas such as agriculture, water management, health, security, technology, and education.
The Renaissance Dam and Egypt in the eye of the storm
The conflict over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) between Egypt and Ethiopia is of strategic importance to Israel. Ethiopia is the most populous Arab country and the first to sign a peace treaty with Israel. As its southern neighbor, Ethiopia shares a number of common interests: security, politics, and economics. Ethiopia is a pivotal state in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa region near the Red Sea, and is experiencing rapid development. This is where its importance for Israel stems, as it strives to expand its political and economic ties on the continent.
It is true that Israel seeks to maintain close relations with both countries, and may have decided to avoid involvement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis by adopting a neutral stance centered around supporting a mutually beneficial solution. This is despite Egyptโs request in 2018 to use its influence in Ethiopia on the issue to its advantage.
However, Egypt itself witnessed a major uproar in 2019, following successive reports about Israel establishing an air defense system around the dam. Following Egyptian outrage, the Israeli embassy in Cairo was forced to issue a denial, without verifying its authenticity. This recalls the threat made by former Israeli Foreign and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman to bomb the dam a quarter century ago.
Despite Israelโs apparent bias toward Ethiopia at the expense of Egypt, with which relations have been deteriorating significantly since the outbreak of the bloody aggression on Gaza, and the fear of an Israeli plan to displace hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to Sinai, and the possibility of besieging it from the south via Ethiopia and South Sudan, Israeli political and diplomatic circles do not hide their reluctance to become involved in the Ethiopian-Egyptian dispute over the Renaissance Dam, for several reasons, the most important of which are:
This is a sensitive and complex conflict, in which two countries โfriendlyโ to Israel are making strong arguments and have no interest in choosing sides. The chances of Israeli mediation between the two countries are slim, and it has no comparative advantage over other countries or international bodies that have attempted to mediate between them, but failed.
Israelโs ability to provide practical solutions to the underlying water crisis is limited, given Egyptian reservations, the severity of the challenge posed by the regionโs scarce water resources, demographic growth, worsening climate change, and the difficulty of raising the capital needed for desalination solutions on the scale required.
Israelโs neutral stance on the dam issue aligns with its preference not to accept a resolution in the legal dispute, which has a religious and historical dimension, between the Egyptian Coptic Church and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church over control of the Deir al-Sultan Monastery in the Old City of occupied Jerusalem. Any โpublicโ Israeli involvement in the conflict risks damaging its image in Egypt, which is often accused of plots and conspiracies against it.
If the two countries eventually reach an agreed-upon settlement formula, Israel is positively considering joining the regional cooperation that Egypt is seeking to achieve in the Nile Basin.
Israel fears that if it publicly takes a pro-Ethiopian stance, it will lose its relations with Egypt in the energy sector, within the framework of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF).
Mobilizing Ethiopian and African pressure against the Houthis
Saโar did not miss his meeting with his Ethiopian counterpart, who visited Tel Aviv in March, nor during his meeting with him in Addis Ababa a few days earlier, without inciting what he described as โIslamic terrorism.โ He attempted to link the Houthi threat to Israel and the al-Shabaab threat to Ethiopia, in a blatant attempt to present them as a common threat to both sides. The former threatens Israeli airspace and ports, while the latter targets the stability of the Horn of Africa, according to Israel. Both cooperate and receive support from Iran.
He claimed that โthe Houthis have launched hundreds of missiles and drones at Israelis since October 7, 2023, disrupting international trade routes. They are now threatening to prevent Israeli ships from passing through the Red Sea, posing a threat to both Israel and Africa. We are witnessing the rise of extremist Islam in our shared regions: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, jihadists in Syria, and al-Shabaab in Africa. They must be eliminated.โ
The common goal is not to turn the Red Sea into an โArabian Seaโ!
Israel is one of Ethiopiaโs most important military suppliers, and for many years they have made no secret of their plan to prevent a situation in which the Red Sea becomes an โArabโ sea. Consequently, Israelโs aspiration has been, and continues to be, to limit Arab influence in this region of the world. Here, one can recall the Israeli bombing of numerous Iranian arms convoys en route from Africa, passing through Sudan and reaching the Gaza Strip. It is difficult to imagine the success of these operations without security and intelligence cooperation from Ethiopia, which enjoys geographical proximity to the Red Sea.
Israel also shares Ethiopiaโs efforts to access the Red Sea. Ethiopia is the most populous country in the region, but lacks access to the sea. Over the past years, Israel has sought to gain access to the Red Sea, which serves both of their goals: controlling the seaports and preventing Iranian strategic influence.
Here, Israelโs growing relations with Somaliland, which have recently witnessed increasing warmth, stand out. Although this is a state that has not yet gained international recognition, ironically, it is the only one that might connect Ethiopia, one of Africaโs largest countries, to the Red Sea, a shared interest for Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa.
The maritime border demarcation agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland in early 2024 represented a fundamental change in the political geography of the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. It is not unlikely that Israel will be a key player in this, either directly or through some of its proxies in the region. Israel has not hidden its welcome of this agreement, as it establishes further security cooperation with Ethiopia, both to confront the Houthis in the near term, and, more importantly, to bring about a positive shift in the strategic balance in the region in its favor in the long term.
At the same time, Israel is seeking to strengthen its ties with Ethiopia, which wields significant influence over a significant number of countries on the continent, to keep hostile actors seeking to expand their influence there, particularly Iran, Qatar, and jihadist organizations. This will have positive repercussions for Israeli security.
Arms deals and security coordination
Ethiopiaโs National Intelligence and Security Service announced the signing of a bilateral agreement with Israel for security and intelligence cooperation, including โcounter-terrorismโ and information exchange, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, Israeli military industries are seeking to place Ethiopia within their circle of interest for arms supplies, particularly as they seek to achieve a degree of balance with Egypt, with which they engage in occasional tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Given Ethiopiaโs significant military lag, this could lead them to seek refuge in Israel.
Israeli military circles note the vast gap between the forces of the two important countries, which gives Egypt a clear advantage over Ethiopia in terms of its ability to wield military power.
In addition to the trade and economic relations between Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa, security and military issues play a significant role in strengthening these relations. Indeed, they appear to be the dominant factor in their development, even if they are not publicly addressed to avoid offending the sensitivities of some regional countries that do not maintain good neighborly relations with Ethiopia.
Numerous Israeli sources report arms deals with several African countries, including Ethiopia, focusing on small arms such as rifles and machine guns, artillery systems, mortars, surveillance systems, security forces, and troop training. This has prompted human rights organizations to accuse Israel of complicity in supporting oppressive regimes in Africa that persecute their opponents and commit war crimes against ethnic minorities using Israeli weapons.
Israel is one of Ethiopiaโs most important arms suppliers, supporting it during its numerous wars on the continent. It maintains close ties with most of its neighbors, such as Eritrea, South Sudan, and Kenya. It operates a naval base and intelligence station in some of these countries for the purpose of eavesdropping on regional countries, as part of an effort to thwart arms smuggling from Iran to resistance forces in the region hostile to Israel. It also markets itself to Ethiopia and other African countries as a necessary stepping stone to rapprochement with.
